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Fink: Copyright Law

COPYRIGHT LAW
SUMMARY

INDIRECT PROFITS MAYBE INCLUDED AS DAMAGES
FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Frank Music v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,t the Ninth Circuit found that indirect profits from an infringing use of a copyright could be included in a computation of the infringer's profits under section 101(b) of the Copyright Act of 1909. 2
Plaintiffs filed suit alleging copyright infringement, unfair
competition and breach of contract, after defendants used five
songs from plaintiffs' dramatico-musical play, Kismet, in a musical revue staged at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas between
1974 and 1976. Defendants, the hotel-casino operator and the
show's producer-director, claimed their use fell within the terms
of a blanket license agreement between themselves and the
American Society for Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP).s The district court· found that the license specifically excluded use of "visual representations"l1 of plaintiffs' work, that
1. 772 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Fletcher, J.; other panel members were
Boochever, J., and Reinhardt, J.).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970). Although this Act has been superceded by the Copyright Act of 1976, current Title 17 of the United States Code, all actions complained of
in this suit occurred before the effective date of the new Act, January I, 1978. 772 F.2d
at 512 n.4.
3. 772 F.2d at 510. In 1965, plaintiffs granted to ASCAP the right to license certain
rights in the musical score of their play. [d.
4. Trial was held in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, Robert J. Kelleher, District Judge, presiding.
5. 772 F.2d at 511. Paragraph 3 of the license provided, in pertinent part, that
"[t]his license shall not extend to or be deemed to include: ... songs or other excerpts
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the defendants' use was therefore an infringing use, and awarded
plaintiffs $22,000 as that share of defendants' profits attributable to the infringement.6 The district court dismissed the unfair
competition and breach of contract claims. Both parties
appealed.
II. COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that
the defendants' use was beyond the scope of their license. 7 On
appeal, the defendants argued that the district court failed to
give sufficient consideration to the source of alleged copying. Defendants claimed that visual representations which could be said
to have been derived from the original stage play, Kismet, would
not be protected by plaintiffs' copyright which extended only to
the dramatico-musical adaptation of the play.8 The panel found
this argument unpersuasive on two counts: 1) that the evidence
established that the producer had access to and relied on the
plaintiffs' Broadway score; and 2) that the question of the
copyrightability of the "visual representations" was irrelevant,
since the prohibition in the license was not limited to "copyrightable" visual representations. 9
The panel then turned to the issue of damages. The Copyright Act of 190910 provided for recovery of "such damages as
the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringe~
ment, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have
made from such an infringement."ll Actual damages are the extent to which the market value of a copyrighted work has been
injured or destroyed by an infringement. 111 A court could also
from operas or musical plays accompanied either by words, pantomime, dance, or visual
representation of the work from which the music is taken . . . ." [d. at 511 n.2 (emphasis added).
6. [d. at 509.
7. [d. at 512.
8. [d. at 511. The original dramatic play Kismet was written by Edward Knoblock
in 1911 and copyrighted as an unpublished work that same year. The work was again
copyrighted as a published work in 1912. These copyrights expired in 1967 and thus the
work was in the public domain at the time of the defendants' infringement. [d. at 509-10.
9. [d. at 512. See supra note 5.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970).
11. [d.
12. 772 F.2d at 512 (quoting 3 M. NIMMER. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.02 at 14-6
(1985)).
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award statutory "in lieu" damages. IS The Ninth Circuit had always interpreted the above-quoted section of the Act as allowing
the greater of the actual damage to plaintiff's copyright or the
infringer's profits. H
The district court in the instant case found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove any actual damage to their copyright,
since they had failed to show that the market value of the copyrighted work had been diminished.lI~ The test in the Ninth Circuit for determining market. value at the time of the infringement is "what a willing buyer would have been reasonably
required to pay to a willing seller for plaintiffs' work."ls Plaintiffs introduced opinion testimony to the effect that defendants'
use had completely destroyed the market in Las Vegas for a full
production of Kismet, thereby entitling them to recover the
value of a license for a full production. 17 Although this testimony
was uncontradicted, the Ninth Circuit noted that the trial court
was entitled to reject any proffered measure of damages which is
too speculative. IS Uncertainty as to the amount of actual damages will not prevent their recovery, but uncertainty as to the
fact of damages may.19 Plaintiffs had not presented any "disinterested testimony" to the effect that defendants' use of six minutes of plaintiffs' work precluded plaintiffs from presenting Kismet in its entirety at another hotePO Since it was reasonable to
conclude that defendants' use did not significantly impair the
prospects of presenting a full production, the panel concluded
that the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding plaintiffs' theory of damages too uncertain and speculative. 21
Because the court determined that no actual damage had
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970). This section allowed the court to award, "in lieu of
actual damages and profits, such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered
due to the to the court shall appear to be just." Id. See infra note 45.
14. 772 F.2d at 512 & n.5.
15. Id. at 513.
16. Id. at 513 n.6 (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald's,
562 F.2d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 1977) (Krofft 1)).
17. 772 F.2d at 513.
18.Id.
19. Id. (citing Universal Pictures v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 369 (9th Cir.
1947»(emphasis added).
20. 772 F.2d at 513. The opinion testimony relating to the value of a license for a
full production was given by the copyright owner and the leasing agent. Id.
21. Id. at 513-14.
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occurred, it turned to the issue of the infringer's profits. In establishing the infringer's profits, the plaintiff is required to
prove only the defendant's gross revenue from the infringement;
the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove the elements of
costs to be deducted from revenue to arrive at profit. 22 However,
in the event the infringement is willful, conscious or deliberate,
there is no deduction for the infringer's overhead. 23
The district court allowed deductions for direct and indirect
costs amounting to eighty-nine percent of the revenue collected
for defendants' revue. 24 The plaintiffs appealed these calculations on several grounds. 211 Plaintiffs first argued that the defendants' use was willful and deliberate and, therefore, no deductions should have been allowed. The Ninth Circuit rejected
this argument, affirming the district court's determination that
defendants believed they were acting within the scope of their
ASCAP license. 26
Plaintiffs further charged that the defendants had failed to
adequately prove that each item of claimed overhead assisted in
the production of the infringing revue. Defendants calculated
the claimed expenses by allocating a portion of the total operating expenses of the hotel based on the ratio between the revenue
generated by the show and the total revenue of the hotel. 27 The
district court accepted nearly all of the defendants' calculations
as presented. 28 While the Ninth Circuit accepted the district
court's finding that this method of allocation was a reasonably
acceptable formula, the panel concluded that defendants had
failed to prove that these expenses actually contributed to the
production of the show. 29 The court stated:
22. 1d. at 514 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970)).
23. [d. at 515 (citing Kamar Int'l v. Russ Berrie & Co., 752 F.2d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir.
1984)).
24. 1d. at 514-15. The district court found gross revenue from the revue of
$24,191,690 from which it deducted $18,060,084 of direct costs and $3,641,960 of indirect
costs (overhead) to arrive at a net profit of $2,489,646. [d. at 515.
25. 1d. at 515. Plaintiffs made several challenges, although the court dealt with some
of them in a footnote. 1d. at 515 n.9. These challenges pertained to the district court's
failure to exclude, as a sanction for failure to cooperate in discovery, certain evidence
offered by the defendants. All of these challenges were rejected by the court. [d.
26. 1d. at 515.
27. 1d. at 516.
28. 1d. at 516 & n.l0.
29. 1d. at 516.
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[A] deduction for overhead should be allowed
"only when the infringer can demonstrate that
[the overhead expense] was of actual assistance in
the production, distribution or sale of the infringing product." [citations omitted]. We do not take
this to mean that an infringer must prove his
overhead expenses and their relationship to the
infringing production in minute detail. [citations
omitted]. Nonetheless, the defendant bears the
burden of explaining, at least in general terms,
how claimed overhead actually contributed to the
production of the infringing work. so

The Ninth Circuit noted that the defendants had offered no
evidence of what costs were included in the general categories
presented to the trial court, nor did they offer any evidence concerning how these costs contributed to the production of the infringing show. 81 The panel concluded, therefore, that the district
court's finding that defendants had established the connection
between the claimed expenses and the production was clearly
erroneous. 82
The question of whether plaintiffs were entitled to recover
"indirect profits" from an infringment was one of first impression before the court. Plaintiffs specifically challenged the failure of the district court to include MGM's profits from its hotel
and casino operations in arriving at the gross revenue. In its
computations, the district court had relied only upon the gross
revenue from the show, apparently ignoring the plaintiffs'
claim. 88 The court first looked to the 1909 Act, which provided
that the copyright owner was entitled to "all the profits which
the infringer shall have made. . . ."84 The panel concluded that
the language was broad enough to permit recovery of indirect as
well as direct profits. 8G The court also looked to other cases from
the Ninth Circuit, including Sid & Marty Krofft Television Pro30. Id. (quoting Kamar Int'l v. Russ Berrie & Co., 752 F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir.
1984)).
31. 772 F.2d at 516.
32.Id.
33. Id. at 516-17.
34. Id. at 517 (refering to 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970».
35.Id.
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ductions v. McDonald's (Krofft II),36 where the court awarded
substantial statutory "in lieu" damages for use of plaintiff's
characters in a series of television commercials. 37 Although the
court in Krofft II found plaintiff's formula for computing the
indirect profit to be too speculative, the court found a higher
award of damages to be warranted where a significant portion of
the infringer's profit was not "ascertainable."38
The panel here found the promotional value of defendants'
show to be analogous to the promotional value of the television
commercials in Krofft II. Since the purpose of the show was to
draw people to the hotel and gaming tables, the court concluded
that the profits from these operations should be included in the
damage computation, if such amounts could be ascertained. 39
The court then addressed the issue of apportioning profits
between those attributable to the infringing acts and those attributable to other factors. The burden of proving the contribution of profit elements other than the infringed property is the
defendant's.4o Only a just and reasonable apportionment is required; the trial court need not be exact and a formula will be
upheld so long as it is not clearly erroneous. 41 The district court
determined that the plaintiffs should be awarded $22,000, but
gave no reasoned explanation or formula for its apportionment. 42
The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court's
award was grossly inadequate. 43 The panel examined the record
and found conflicting evidence as to the relative importance of
36. 1983 COPYRIGHT LAW DECISIONS (CCH) 1125,572 at 18,381 (C.D. Cal. 1983)(Krofft
I1), on remand from 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).

37. [d. at 18,387.
38. [d. at 18,384 & n.ll. The plaintiffs in the Krofft cases, creators of the "H.R.
PufnstuC' children's television program, alleged that they were entitled to a portion of
the profit earned by McDonald's on its food sales as damages for the "McDonaldland"
television commercials which infringed on plaintiffs' copyright. The Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' formula for computing these profits as speculative. However, in awarding $1,044,000 in statutory "in lieu" damages, the Ninth Circuit stated that "because a
significant portion of the defendant's profits are unascertainable, a higher award of in
lieu damages is warranted." [d.
39. 772 F.2d at 517.
40. [d. at 518 (citing Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, 592 F.2d 651,
657 (2nd Cir. 1978)).
41. 772 F.2d at 518.
42. [d.
43. [d.
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the Kismet music to the defendants' show. The panel also noted
that the award amounted to less than one percent of MGM
Grand's profits from the show, which was wholly disproportionate both to the success of the show and to the magnitude of the
defendants' profit." The panel remanded the apportionment issue to the district court with instructions to fully explain its reasons and the resulting method of apportionment it selects, and
to include indirect profits in the calculation if possible. The
panel cautioned, however, that if the district court was unable to
devise a reasonable, nonspeculative formula, then the district
court should grant statutory "in lieu" damages. 4G
In its discussion of statutory damages, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the purposes of the remedy provisions of the Copyright
Act: to provide adequate compensation to the copyright owner,
to discourage wrongful conduct, and to deter infringement. 48
The panel concluded that the district court's award was obviously too little to discourage wrongful conduct or deter infringment, and instructed the district court on remand to exercise its
discretion to award statutory damages which effectuate the purposes of the Act. 47
The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court's apparent
judgment of joint and several liability of the defendants. 48 The
panel noted that joint and several liability is proper for an
award of actual damages, but that each infringer is liable for its
44. [d. The court noted in a footnote that the apportionment percentages in similar
cases were markedly higher. [d. at 518 n.ll (citing, inter alia, Universal Pictures v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 377 (9th Cir. 1947)(infringing use of one comedy sketch in
motion picture; court affirmed award of 20% of infringing movie's profits)).
45. [d. at 519. Statutory "in lieu" damages are mandatory when injury to copyright
has been proved, but neither the actual damages to the copyright owner nor the infringer's profit can be ascertained. Under the 1909 Act, if either actual damages or infringer's profits are ascertainable, then the trial court has discretion to award statutory
damages. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970). Under the current Act, statutory damages are available at plaintiff's election instead of, not in addition to, actual damages and profits. 17
U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976). Such an award must be in excess of the amount which would have
been awarded as profits or actual damages. Frank Music, 772 F.2d at 520. Under the
current Act, statutory damages are limited to a maximum of $10,000 per work infringed,
unless plaintiff shows the infringement was willful, in which case the maximum is
$50,000 per work infringed. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976).
46. 772 F.2d at 520.
47. [d.
48. [d. at 519. The district court's judgment was rendered "against defendants."
The Ninth Circuit interpreted this to mean joint and several liability. [d.
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share of infringing profits; one defendant is not liable for the
profits of another.49 The panel remanded the question of joint
liability to the district court, with instructions to consider defendant producer-director's relation to the production (employee, independent contractor or partner), whether he received
a salary or a percentage of profits from defendant MGM Grand,
or whether he bore any risk of loss on the production. lio The
panel went on to state that the hotel's parent company, MGM,
Inc., might also be liable for its subsidiary, and the parent c~m
pany's profits included in a damage calculation, if the district
court should find a "substantial and continuing connection" between MGM Grand and MGM, Inc.lil
The panel concluded by affirming the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' unfair competition and breach of contract
claims. iiI!
III. CONCURRENCE
Judge Reinhardt filed a one paragraph concurrence. While
he agreed almost completely with the majority, he disagreed
with the district court's finding that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove actual damage to their copyright. He concluded that the
market value of the plaintiffs' copyright was reduced by the inclusion of Kismet music in over 1700 performances of defendants' show. liS
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Ninth Circuit's decision is framed in terms of
the 1909 Act, it is clear that its rulings regarding the inclusion of
indirect profits are equally applicable to the provisions of the
current Copyright Act.1i4 The current Act contains similar language regarding recovery of an infringer's profits. 1i1i This decision
49.Id.
50.Id.
51. Id. at 519-20. The plaintiffs' would be limited to a single recovery, however, to
be satisfied by either the parent or the subsidiary. Id. at 520.
52. Id. at 520-21.
53. 772 F.2d at 521 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1976).
55. The current statute provides, in pertinent part, for the recovery of "actual dam-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss1/8

8

Fink: Copyright Law

1986]

COPYRIGHT LAW

47

could also significantly increase recovery for copyright infringement in the Ninth Circuit, as the new Act unequivocally provides that actual damages and infringer's profits are recoverable. lle It will be interesting to note how other circuits deal with
the indirect profits issue when confronted by it. The Ninth Circuit may well turn out to be a pioneer of larger awards for copyright infringement.
David A. Fink*

age suffered by ... [the copyright owner(s)) as a result of the infringement, and any
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into
account in computing the actual damages." 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
The 1909 Act allowed recovery of "all the profits which the infringer shall have made
from such infringement . . . . " 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970). See supra text accompanying
notes 33-35.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1976). For a discussion of this case as it impacts on copyright
law practice, see 2 COPYRIGHT L.J. 38 (1985).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988.
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